

**NEO CLASSICAL SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT
(*KESELAMATAN & PEMBANGUNAN – KESBAN*) IN
COUNTERING CRIMINAL INSURGENCY IN EASTERN
SABAH**

ABDUL RAHMAN BIN ALAVI

**DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
(STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)**

UNIVERSITI PERTAHANAN NASIONAL MALAYSIA

2023

NEO CLASSICAL SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT (*KESELAMATAN & PEMBANGUNAN – KESBAN*) CONCEPT IN COUNTERING CRIMINAL INSURGENCY IN EASTERN SABAH

ABDUL RAHMAN BIN ALAVI

Thesis submitted to Centre for Graduate Studies, Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia, in fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy (Strategic and International Relations)

2023

ABSTRACT

Security and Development or *KESBAN* is a classical counterinsurgency framework that was employed as a tool in defeating the communist terrorist under the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) banner. It was a population-centric approach to impede communist ideology and militant activities during the Second Malayan Emergency (1969-1989). It was a three-prong framework strategized to protect the people as well as to develop the nation. This study aimed to engage the classical *KESBAN* concept complement with some value-added elements strengthening the counterinsurgency framework as a neo-classical approach to confront criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah perpetrated by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The main objectives of the study are to determine the nature of criminality in Eastern Sabah and classifying it as insurgency and to examine the suitability of applying *KESBAN* concept against the criminal insurgency. The study will also explore the nexus between some counterinsurgency theories with the *KESBAN* concept. This study adopted qualitative approach research emphasizing textual analysis, with a case study approach using triangulation of primary and secondary data processes. However, primary data are used as confirmatory evidence for the secondary data. The finding of the study suggests that the neo-classical *KESBAN* concept is applicable in any insurgency situation. It also substantiates that the criminal ventures in Eastern Sabah are acts of insurgency and the neo-classical counterinsurgency (*KESBAN*) approach augmented with comprehensive strategies (intelligence, centralized command, efficiency of the security forces, and dissolution of insurgent networks) works to dissolve the criminal insurgency. The study also recommended future research studies on the “water village” resettlement program and the benefits of joint operations with the Philippines military against the ASG.

ABSTRAK

Keselamatan dan Pembangunan atau KESBAN merupakan suatu rangka kerja yang digunakan sebagai alat untuk melawan pengganas komunis yang di ketuai oleh Parti Komunis Malaya (PKM). Ia merupakan pendekatan berpusatkan rakyat bagi menyekat ideologi dan aktiviti militan komunis semasa Darurat Malaya Kedua (1969-1989). Ia merupakan rangka kerja serampang tiga mata yang mengambil pendekatan untuk melindungi rakyat serta membangunkan negara. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk mengaitkan konsep KESBAN klasikal diperkasa dengan beberapa elemen sebagai nilai tambah yang mengukuhkan rangka kerja melawan insurgency sebagai pendekatan neo-klasikal bagi menghadapi jenayah insurgency di Timur Sabah yang pelopori oleh Kumpulan Abu Sayyaf (KAS). Objektif utama kajian adalah untuk mengkaji sifat jenayah di Timur Sabah dan mengklasifikasikannya sebagai insurgency serta mengkaji kesesuaian menerapkan konsep KESBAN terhadap jenayah insurgency. Kajian ini juga telah meneroka perkaitan di antara beberapa teori terkemuka melawan insurgency dengan konsep KESBAN. Kajian ini mengguna pakai kajian pendekatan kualitatif yang menekankan analisis tekstual, diperkuatkan dengan pendekatan kajian kes menggunakan triangulasi proses data primer dan sekunder. Walau bagaimanapun, data primer digunakan sebagai bukti pengesahan untuk data sekunder. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan bahawa konsep KESBAN neo-klasikal boleh digunapakai dalam sebarang situasi insurgency. Ia juga membuktikan bahawa aktiviti jenayah di Timur Sabah adalah tindakan insurgency dan pendekatan melawan insurgency neo-klasikal (KESBAN) yang dinilai tambah dengan strategi komprehensif (perisikan, perintah berpusat, kecekapan pasukan keselamatan, dan pembubaran rangkaian insurgency) berfungsi untuk menghancurkan insurgency jenayah. Kajian ini juga mengesyorkan supaya satu penyelidikan masa depan mengenai program penempatan semula "perkampungan air" dan faedah operasi bersama dengan tentera Filipina terhadap ASG dilakukan secara berasingan.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Alhamdulillah, Praise to Allah SWT for His blessing, guidance, and permission allowed me to complete my Ph.D. research thesis entitled, "Neo-Classical Security and Development (*Keselamatan dan Pembangunan - KESBAN*) in Countering Criminal Insurgency in Eastern Sabah ". In fact, it was a great achievement for being able to complete this thesis at my age now after my retirement from the Armed Forces. I would also like to express my gratitude and sincere thanks to my supervisors who gave me abundant encouragement, guidance, and advice which were very beneficial and assisted in completing this thesis. I pray Allah SWT that my supervisor Associate Prof. Dr. Wan Norhasniah binti Wan Husin, Prof. Emeritus Dato' Dr. Wan Hashim bin Wan Teh and Colonel Associate Prof. Dr. Zaini bin Mohd Salleh are blessed with excellent health, and intelligent to continue guiding other students to achieve similar successes. My sincere thanks and gratitude to the Vice Chancellor, Dean, Head of Departments and Faculty members, and fellow lecturers at the Centre of Graduate Studies (PPS), Defence Studies and Management (FPPP), General Tun Ibrahim Library, for their understanding and patience in completing my thesis. Thank you and I always value being part of the family member in UPM. I would also take this opportunity to extend my thankfulness to thesis interview participants, General Tan Sri Dato' Seri Panglima Professor Zulkifli bin Zainal Abidin, Tun Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad, Tun Mohd Hanif bin Omar for assisting me in verifying some of the doubts emerged during the course of the research.

Notwithstanding, my greatest appreciation and sincere thanks to my family, especially my wife Maimun binti Haji Abdullah who has been patient throughout my absence from home in completing my study. To my children Jalil, Razif, Syafeeq, Abbas, and Adilah. To my grandchildren who were living with me Rania, Zehra, Arifz, and Medina for their sacrifice for not being with them all the time. Thank you and may Allah bless all of you.

APPROVAL

The Examination Committee has met on **26 October 2023** to conduct the final examination of **LT COL ABDUL RAHMAN BIN ALAVI** on his PhD thesis entitled '**NEO CLASSICAL SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT (KESELAMATAN & PEMBANGUNAN – KESBAN) CONCEPT IN COUNTERING CRIMINAL INSURGENCY IN EASTERN SABAH**'.

The committee recommends that the student be awarded the Doctor of Philosophy (Strategic and International Relations)

Members of the Examination Committee were as follows.

Colonel Abdul Latif bin Harun

(Retired) Faculty of Defence

Studies & Management Universiti

Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia

(Chairman)

Professor Dr. Mohd Mizan bin Mohd

Assalam Faculty of Defence Studies &

Management Universiti Pertahanan

Nasional Malaysia (Internal Examiner)

Professor Dato' Dr. Sivamurugan a/l

Pandian School of Social Sciences

Universiti Sains Malaysia

(External Examiner)

Associate Professor Dr. Ramli bin

Dollah

Faculty of Social Science & Humanity

Universiti Malaysia Sabah

(External Examiner)

APPROVAL

This thesis was submitted to the Senate of Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia and has been accepted as fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Strategic and International Relations). The members of the Supervisory Committee were as follows.

Associate Professor Dr. Wan Norhasniah binti Wan Husin

Faculty of Defence Studies &
ManagementUniversiti Pertahanan
Nasional Malaysia (Main Supervisor)

Professor Emeritus Dato' Dr. Wan Hashim bin Wan Teh

Faculty of Defence Studies &
ManagementUniversiti Pertahanan
Nasional Malaysia (Co Supervisor)

Colonel Associate Professor Dr. Mohd Zaini bin Salleh (Retired)

Faculty of Defence Studies &
ManagementUniversiti Pertahanan
Nasional Malaysia (Co Supervisor)

UNIVERSITI PERTAHANAN NASIONAL MALAYSIA

DECLARATION OF THESIS

Student's full name : Abdul Rahman bin Alavi
Date of birth : 30th of July, 1957
Title : Neo Classical Security & Development (*Keselamatan & Pembangunan – Kesban*) in Countering Criminal Insurgency in Eastern Sabah
Academic session : 2018/2019

I hereby declare that the work in this thesis is my own except for quotations and summaries which have been duly acknowledged.

I further declare that this thesis is classified as:

- ☐ **CONFIDENTIAL** (Contains confidential information under the official Secret Act 1972) *
- ☐ **RESTRICTED** (Contains restricted information as specified by the organisation where research was done) *
- ☒ **OPEN ACCESS** I agree that my thesis to be published as online open access (full text)

I acknowledge that Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia reserves the right as follows.

1. The thesis is the property of Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia.
2. The library of Universiti Pertahanan Nasional Malaysia has the right to make copies for the purpose of research only.

The library has the right to make copies of the thesis for academic exchange.

Signature

**Signature of Supervisor/Dean of

CGS

Click here to enter text.

IC/Passport No.
CGS

**Name of Supervisor/Dean of

Date:

Date:

*If the thesis is CONFIDENTIAL OR RESTRICTED, please attach the letter from the organisation with period and reasons for confidentiality and restriction.

** Witness

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	ii
ABSTRAK	iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	iv
EXAMINER APPROVAL	v
SUPERVISOR APPROVAL	vi
DECLARATION OF THESIS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
LIST OF TABLES	xiv
LIST OF FIGURES	xv
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xvi
 CHAPTER	
1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Background of Study	1
1.2 Problem Statement	7
1.3 Research Questions	9
1.4 Research Objectives	10
1.5 Literature Review	11
1.5.1 Past Works on <i>KESBAN</i> Concept	12
1.5.2 Identifying Research Gap	19
1.6 Conceptual Framework	25
1.7 Research Methodology	30
1.7.1 Data Collection	32
1.7.1.1 <i>Phase 1 - Secondary Source</i>	32
1.7.1.2 <i>Analysis of Secondary Source</i>	35
1.7.1.3 <i>Phase 2 - Primary Source</i>	35
1.7.1.4 Analysis of primary Source	37
1.7.1.5 <i>Phase Three: Observation/ Field Work</i>	38
1.7.2 Triangulation Data Process	40
1.8 Research Scope	42
1.9 Research Significance	42

1.10	Research Limitation	45
1.11	Operational Definition	45
1.12	Chapters of the Research	52
1.13	Conclusion	56
2	COUNTER INSURGENCY THEORIES	60
2.1	Introduction	61
2.2	The Counterinsurgency Theories	61
2.2.1	Thompson's five principles of Counterinsurgency	63
2.2.2	David Galula's four principles of Counterinsurgency theory	71
2.2.2.1	The basic characteristics	73
2.2.2.2	Galula Strategy for Counterinsurgency Theory	79
2.2.3	Kilcullen's three pillars of counterinsurgency theory	81
2.2.3.1	The Security Pillar	83
2.2.3.2	The Political Pillar	84
2.2.3.3	The Economic Pillar	85
2.3	The Contribution of Counterinsurgency Theories towards <i>KESBAN</i> Concept	85
2.4	Conclusion	88
3	SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT (KESBAN) CONCEPT	89
3.1	Introduction	89
3.2	Classical <i>KESBAN</i> Concept	90
3.2.1	Fundamental thrust of <i>KESBAN</i>	90
3.2.1.1	<i>The internal security</i>	90
3.2.1.2	<i>Internal development (IDEV)</i>	93
3.2.1.3	<i>The Hearts and Minds</i>	94
3.2.2	Government Countermeasures	96
3.2.2.1	<i>Civil Countermeasures</i>	96
3.2.2.2	<i>Psychological Warfare</i>	103

	3.2.2.3	<i>Military Operations</i>	104
	3.2.2.4	<i>The Effect of government countermeasure</i>	109
3.3		Integral Elements of <i>KESBAN</i>	119
	3.3.1	The principles of <i>KESBAN</i>	120
	3.3.2	The strategy of <i>KESBAN</i>	122
3.4		Conclusion	128
4		NEXUS BETWEEN COUNTERINSURGENCY	
		THEORIES AND <i>KESBAN</i> CONCEPT	131
4.1		Introduction	131
4.2		The Nexus of Counterinsurgency Theories and <i>KESBAN</i>	
		Concept	131
	4.2.1	Thompson theory and <i>KESBAN</i> concept	132
	4.2.2	Galula theory and <i>KESBAN</i> concept	135
	4.2.3	Kilcullen Theory and <i>KESBAN</i> Concept	136
	4.2.4	Comprehensive strategies against criminal	
		insurgencies	137
	4.2.4.1	<i>Intelligence</i>	138
	4.2.4.2	<i>Centralised command</i>	140
	4.2.4.3	<i>Efficiency of armed forces</i>	142
	4.2.4.4	<i>Dissolution of insurgency network</i>	144
	4.2.5	Categorizing criminality as insurgencies	146
4.3		Comprehensive Strategies Against Insurgency	
		in Colombia	151
	4.3.1	Intelligence	152
	4.3.2	Centralised Command	153
	4.3.3	Efficiency of the armed forces	155
	4.3.4	Dissolution of insurgency network	156
4.4		Comprehensive Strategies Against Insurgency in	
		Sri Lanka	157
	4.4.1	Intelligence	159
	4.4.2	Centralised command	161
	4.4.3	Efficiency of security forces	162

	4.4.4	Dissolution of insurgency network	163
	4.5	Conclusion	164
5		CRIMINAL INSURGENCY IN EASTERN SABAH	166
	5.1	Introduction	166
	5.2	Understanding Criminal Insurgency	167
	5.2.1	Criminal Insurgency in Sabah	169
	5.2.2	The Aspiration of criminal insurgents	172
	5.3	Security Backdrop of Eastern Sabah	173
	5.3.1	Historical Perspective of Sabah	174
	5.3.2	“Water Village” squatters issue	179
	5.4	Abu Sayyaf as A Criminal Insurgent Group	182
	5.4.1	Characteristics of criminal insurgencies in Eastern Sabah	184
	5.4.1.1	<i>Undermining the Ability of the Government</i>	184
	5.4.1.2	<i>Obtaining the Active or passive support of the Population</i>	185
	5.4.1.3	<i>Provoking the Government into committing abuses</i>	187
	5.4.1.4	<i>Insurgency is a political competition</i>	188
	5.4.1.5	<i>Distinction between civilian and combatant is blurred</i>	190
	5.4.1.6	<i>Undermine international support for the government gaining international recognition or assistance for insurgency</i>	191
	5.4.2	The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)	193
	5.5	Conclusion	199
6		NEO-CLASSICAL KESBAN CONCEPTS IN COUNTERING CRIMINAL INSURGENCY IN EASTERN SABAH	201
	6.1	Introduction	201
	6.2	Comprehensive Strategy against Criminal Insurgency in Eastern Sabah	203

6.2.1	Intelligence	205
6.2.1.1	<i>Stirring Intelligence on Abu Sayyaf Group</i>	208
6.2.2	Centralized command	215
6.2.2.1	<i>Centralizing command against Abu Sayyaf group</i>	217
6.2.3	Efficiency of armed forces	223
6.2.3.1	<i>Potency of the security forces on Abu Sayyaf Group</i>	225
6.2.4	Dissolution of insurgency network	227
6.2.4.1	<i>Dissolution of Insurgents' Network on Abu Sayyaf Group</i>	231
6.3	Conclusion	234

7	CONCLUSIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATION	236
7.1	Conclusion	236
7.1.1	Annotating Classical Security and Development (KESBAN) Concept and analyse its nexus with other popular Counterinsurgency theories	237
7.1.2	Designing a Neo-Classical counterinsurgency framework by value-add Comprehensive Strategies to deal with Criminal Insurgency	244
7.1.3	Determining the nature of criminality in Eastern Sabah and classifying it as insurgency	246
7.1.4	Analysing neo-classical <i>KESBAN</i> Concept in Countering criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah	247
7.2	Research Limitation	252
7.3	The Gaps	252
7.4	Contribution	253
7.5	Recommendation	255

7.6	Philosophy of Neo-Classical <i>KESBAN</i>	256
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	258
	BIODATA OF THE STUDENT	283
	LIST OF PUBLICATIONS	284
	APPENDIX	286

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE NO.	TITLE	PAGE
Table 1.	Operational definition	46
Table 2.	List of jungle forts and jungle posts	101
Table 3.	FELDA Land Development Plan	116

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE NO.	TITLE	PAGE
Figure 1.	Conceptual framework	27
Figure 2.	Visit Locations at OPS PASIR (North)	40
Figure 3.	Visited locations at OPS PASIR (South)	41
Figure 4.	The triangulation data process	42
Figure 5.	Kilcullen's three pillars of counterinsurgency framework	82
Figure 6.	Variety of internal security operations	107
Figure 7.	Construction of East-West highway	112
Figure 8.	The extension of the East-West highway	113
Figure 9.	The Temenggor Dam	115
Figure 10.	Lake Banding (Temenggor)	115
Figure 11.	First Generation FELDA Settlers Home	118
Figure 12.	FELDA Land Development Scheme – Oil Palm Plantation	118
Figure 13.	<i>KESBAN</i> Belt Line	124
Figure 14.	The <i>KESBAN</i> Model	126
Figure 15.	British Royal Marine poses with two decapitated communist heads during the Malayan Emergency	188
Figure 16.	Water Village in Brunei	221
Figure 17.	Structured Water Village	221
Figure 18.	Flexible Fencing for Sea	222

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AOR	Area of Responsibility
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
BNBC	British North Borneo Company
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CPM	Communist Party of Malaya
ESSCOM	Eastern Sabah Security Command
ESSZone	Eastern Sabah Security Zone
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation (USA)
FELDA	Federal Land Development Authority
FIC	Fast Interceptor Craft
GOF	General Operations Force
IDev	Internal Development
IC	Identity Card
IS	Internal Security
JOA	<i>Jabatan Orang Asli</i> (Department of Indigenous Peoples)
KESBAN	<i>Keselamatan dan Pembangunan</i> (Security and Development)
KFR	Kidnap-for-ransom
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KNLF	Karen National Liberation Front
LTTE	Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam
MCP	Malayan Communist Party

MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MIMA	Maritime Institute of Malaysia
MKN (NSC)	<i>Majlis Keselamatan Negara</i> (National Security Council)
MNLA	Malayan National Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MPABA	Malayan People's Anti-British Army
NEP	New Economic Policy
ODA	Overbeck-Dent Association
PFF	Police Field Force
PWD	Public Work Department
RCI	Royal Commission of Inquiry
RISDA	Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority
RELA	<i>Angkatan Ikatan Relawan</i>
RSA	Royal Sulu Army
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
SAPS	South African Police Service
SLAF	Sri Lankan Air Force
SLG	Sri Lankan Government
SLN	Sri Lankan Navy
SSR	Security Sector Reforms
SCO	Sarawak Communist Organisation
TMP	Trilateral Maritime Patrol
UMS	University Malaysia Sabah
VMR	Voice of Malayan Revolution

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

Malaysia had an enduring experience in fighting against insurgency for more than half a century in confrontation with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) during the First and Second Emergency. Now, a similar security instability situation is being faced by Sabah. Sabah is one of the states in Malaysia located on the Northern portion of Borneo. Sabah has land borders with the Malaysian state of Sarawak to the Southwest and Indonesia's Kalimantan region to the South. Sabah shares maritime borders with Vietnam to the West and the Philippines to the North and East. Kota Kinabalu is the state capital city, the economic centre of the state and the seat of the Sabah state government. This state has been experiencing unstable security situation in the form of trans border crimes since before the formation of Federation of Malaysia in 1963, which include Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore into the Federation of Malaysia. Trans border crimes were rampant especially in Eastern Sabah, which has a very close maritime border with the Philippines. The main crime taking place in Eastern Sabah apart from trafficking of drugs and weapons were sea piracy and kidnap-for-ransom.

The primary perpetrator of sea piracy and kidnap-for-ransom were strongly believed to be the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) based on a couple of news reports (Banlaoi, 2006). This group is believed to be the most notorious criminals from Southern Philippines, having their headquarters and bases located around a group of islands in Southern Philippines comprising of the island of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi (Banlaoi, 2010). The purpose of the so-called criminals and pirates was to accumulate wealth for its regime survival by charging non-

traditional security threats or also addressed as trans-border crimes. Most areas in Eastern Sabah have become the havens for pirates from Southern Philippines in carrying out their criminal activities with the support of the local “water village” community by providing temporary transit facilities in form of shelter, food, information as well as hideout in their “water village” for return of money (Ugarte, 2011).

On average, Sabah had suffered ten major criminal attacks since 1976. In 1985, the town of Lahad Datu was attacked by Moro Pirates from Southern Philippines, killing at least 21 people, and injuring 11 others (Masayuki Doi, 1985). In May 2000, the Abu Sayyaf militant group from Southern Philippines kidnapped 21 people consisting of tourists and resort workers in the Padanan and Sipadan Island Resort (Fuller, 2000). The hostages were later rescued in September 2000 following the Philippines army offensive against the pirates. In late February 2013, the village of Tanduo in the Lahad Datu was occupied by several armed Filipino associates of the Sultanate of Sulu, known as Royal Sulu Army (RSA). They claim that Eastern Sabah is part of the North Borneo (Jawhar and Sarriburaja, 2016), which was once owned by the Sultanate of Sulu. The Royal Sulu Army (RSA) created a standoff after prior negotiations to reach a peaceful solution had failed. In response, Malaysian security forces surrounded the village and the standoff escalated into an armed conflict which ended with 68 of the RSA members died and several others were captured by the Malaysian security forces. The standoff itself was an embarrassment to the nation and the security forces. Despite having physical deployment of troops on the three dimensions of war, for example the land, surface, air including the strategic positioning of coastal surveillance radar system, the Sulu Forces manage to penetrate the security fortification of East Sabah in large numbers and occupied a village and created a stand-off (Borneo Post, 2013).

In the post-standoff, on March 7, the Federal Government announced the establishment of Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) to further strengthen the security arrangement in Eastern Sabah (Channel News Asia, 2013). The main security agencies include military, police, maritime enforcement, Customs, and Immigration Departments were deployed under a single command to unfold cooperation and maintain integration among the agencies. ESSCOM is tasked with the security of the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZone), a 1,700km-long special security area along the east coast of Sabah that borders crime-prone Southern Philippines. Despite establishing ESSZone and intensified security system, crimes and kidnapping incidents were still reported (Borneo Post, 2015). It is strongly perceived that there were integration and cooperation controversies clinging among the security agencies, thus affecting the solidarity toward achieving a common goal. According a survey report the main weaknesses identified were the unpreparedness of the country to face such a security breach and intelligence failure (Jawhar and Sarriburaja, 2016).

The criminals in the contemporary world on the other hand were working as state-of-the-art armed groups by employing a carbon-copy of “irregular warfare” approach. The common approach in “irregular warfare,” in that they employ the struggle for legitimacy of theirs and the government’s, the battle (criminality) for influence over a given population, and their role as non-state actors – armed group (Thompson, 2014). They apply irregularity as their modus operandi which describes the nature of threats by employing guerrilla tactics, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal activities, and insurgency (US DoD, 2010). Insurgents, whether the old school or the new form employ same school of thoughts, they avoid all means battlespaces where they are at disadvantage and concentrate on where they could attain parity, particularly psychological and political (McCormick and Giordano, 2007). They normally seek to postpone any decisive action, try to avoid defeat, sustain themselves, broaden their support and shift the power balance in their favour. One way they avoid decisive engagement with the

government security agency in Eastern Sabah is by taking refuge at the “water villages” for shelter and transit (Hickman, 2017).

Therefore, the security agencies and defence community need to “rethink of insurgency” by reviving the old idea with new norms. In fact, they have put aside the glorious moments of their struggle to defeat the insurgents during the Emergency. They must seek new ideas from old conflicts, fighting future insurgency with the last in mind. Countering the classical-orientated insurgent warfare cum crimes by employing new way of counterinsurgency tactics, the security forces should adopt modern technique or neo-classical counterinsurgency approach by combining intelligence, disrupting the insurgent’s network, centralization of command and control, strengthening security forces capacity, and enduring winning the “hearts and minds” strategy in defeating the unfamiliar criminal insurgency with the objective of returning to tranquillity. As at the turn of the twenty first century, the environments are embroiled in new form of insurgency known as the criminal insurgency. This was further influenced by the velocity of communication and the brunt of globalisation. Nevertheless, the classical notions of fighting insurgency or conflict, as Malaysia has encountered during the Emergency periods are still valid and useful by employing the Security and Development (*KESBAN*) concept. Force alone is not enough to break the insurgent’s will to fight (Krenson, 2012). The combination of the elements of national power and the factors affecting the attainment of success against criminal insurgency, may have a persistent effect in the long run. Indeed, the effective employment of national power itself may prevent insurgency or conflict in the first place. Thus, the purpose of the thesis is to examine the classical concept of Security and Development (*KESBAN*) and its applicability on the criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah to subjugate the security dilemma.

The application of *KESBAN* concept in Eastern Sabah against the criminal insurgency conducted by ASG is a resort after various strategies to curb perpetrators from offering violence and to ensure continuous security and tranquillity in that part of the sovereignty. As Garnett (2002) claims that peace is in fact “the absence of war, not the absence of conflict”. The premise of his argument is that the only difference between war and peace is violence, and if there is no violence, there is peace. Therefore, if only ASG can be eliminated like what it was done to Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), then peace can be assured in Eastern Sabah. Malaysia would be able to eliminate this threat by employing a whole-of-government approach, for example the effective employment of national power incorporating the basic considerations of neo-classical counterinsurgency strategies amidst *KESBAN* characteristics. The current on-going strategies and security operations like surveillance, detection and protection concept, role of ESSCOM, OPERATIONS PASIR by Joint Force Headquarters and the Trilateral Maritime Patrol initiative are to continue to ensure the continuity of the denial factor. Application of *KESBAN* approach is an added value to the on-going initiatives.

Security and Development (*KESBAN*) was a concept inspired by late Abdul Razak, the Second Prime Minister of Malaysia to solicit in defeating the communist insurgency inspired by the CPM during Second Malayan Emergency (1969-1989). Security and Development was coined from two Malay words *Keselamatan dan Pembangunan*¹ or in short *KESBAN*. It is a two-pronged approach strategy to defeat the insurgent movement as well as to develop the country socio-economically. It is planned at the national level and organised with a hierarchical structure and chain of command that goes down to district and village levels with the aim to win over the population support. *KESBAN* is defined as the sum of all measures undertaken by

¹ National Security Council Instruction No.11, “*Security and Development Plan at Malaysia-Thailand Border*”, 5th February 1980.

the government agencies to protect the society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (Army Manual of Land Warfare, 1984).

The basic premise in the application of *KESBAN* concept is based on the conviction that Communism (especially in the Third World countries) thrives on poverty (Tolhurst, 2018). *KESBAN* concept emphasizes on two important aspects, Internal Security (IS) and Internal Development (IDEV). The IS aspect is the province of the armed and uniformed bodies, for example, the military and police, in short, the security forces. IDEV mainly involving all the civil government agencies responsible towards the development in the country. This strategy carried out by appropriate government agencies in areas where the communists used to manoeuvre by constructing infrastructure in the form of highways, schools, hospitals, and dams or hydroelectric plants at the same time break the CPM concentration areas. While the security forces were deployed in these areas to ensure security of the development and in return complements development assures security in the future. According to United Nations report: (Annan, 2006; 12)

“...there is no security without development; and no development without security.”

The report discloses that a region will not progress and remain undeveloped when the territory is always threatened and has political or military conflicts following the absence of security, therefore, security is necessary to develop a region.

KESBAN strategy composed of three interdependent components; balanced development, mobilisation, and neutralisation. *First*, balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through balanced political, social, and economic development. It

includes activities to alleviate frustration by providing opportunities to individuals and groups within the society. *Second*, mobilisation which includes assembling government assets and activities to motivate and organise the populace in support of the government through *KESBAN* programmes as well as activities to protect the populace from insurgent actions. *Third*, neutralisation is the effort undertaken to nullify of all unlawful activities to disrupt, disorganise, and defeat the insurgent organization and its entire network (Wei Chong, 2014). The classical *KESBAN* concept aspires to unfold four goals; to deny the spread of communist ideology among the population, to cut off the link between the communist and population, to win the hearts and minds of the population toward supporting government course and eliminate the communist organization and its entire network.

1.2 Research Problem

Despite the strengthening of Eastern Sabah with extensive defence posture through surveillance, deterrence and protection concept, the threat from terrorist group has surged in the past few years reflecting both regional developments and global trends, namely the emergence of the transnational criminals. This coincided with a new wave of piracy attacks launched by ASG off Sabah's coastline, with the renewed international interest in fighting global piracy had restricted ASG's freedom of movement on the Sulu archipelago, limiting its ability to conduct onshore kidnappings via maritime routes. In response, the group moved its operations further out to sea (Curran, 2019), and in 2016, the group conducted 21 successful kidnappings of seafarers while ships were underway (State of Piracy Report, 2016). Reacting to this in June 2017, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia launched a Tripartite Maritime Patrol initiative over the Sulu Sea to curb cross-border sea piracy crimes (Bernama News, 2017).